Euroland 2012-2016 (Part 2)

- Excerpt GEAB N°62 (February 16, 2012) -

2nd Sequence - 2013-2015: Definition of the implementation of Euroland’s international strategy (NATO, UNO, Euro-BRICS, G20…)

Euroland 2012-2016 (Part 2)
If the 2012-2013 period is going to be particularly marked by the stabilization of Euroland’s institutional and economic-financial base, nevertheless it’s from 2013 that we will see the Europeans’ new international maturity. The crisis, and in particular the violent attack suffered by the Eurozone by those who were supposed to be its strategic allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, has in fact radically modified the perception of Euroland’s vital interests, not only on the part of its elite but also its citizens. Outside of the fast contracting core consisting of the Eurosceptic/Occidentalist tandem, 2010/2011 has shown Eurolanders that their allies were at least equally present in Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi or Brasilia, as in London and Washington; just like future of their economic, technological and commercial development (1).

The trend to the continental Europe/USA-UK geopolitical decoupling had started with the crisis over the invasion of Iraq in 2002/2003. It had then been masked by the coming to power in many European countries, in particular in France, of leaders supported by Washington. The crisis blew the dominant Anglo-Saxon model into smithereens and the Eurozone attack showed that Washington and London were nothing more than allies of circumstance for Europe relegating the special transatlantic relationship of the seventy last years to the level of an historical relic. Between 2013 and 2015, this situation will crystallize in particular along three major axes.

On one side, the return of France in its traditional Mitterrand-Gaullist way will imply an important updating within NATO from 2013. The situation is particularly favourable to such a (r)evolution of the old transatlantic machine since the United States no longer has the financial means to impose their will on the European diplomatic and military apparatus (2), and that the analysis of the threats is de facto increasingly divergent. Once the burden of Sarkozy is lifted, European discussion, which on the subject needs a strong French presence to be credible, will find itself completely at odds with that of Washington and London on major issues: Iran, Israel/Palestine, China, Russia,… The “Occidentalists” within the Foreign affairs and Defence ministries are already starting to sense a change in the wind. Most of them having the convictions of their own interests at heart will very quickly convert to the prevailing European viewpoint; the remaining few will join think-tanks whose work will never be read. In practical terms, Euroland will claim control of the European defence theatre - NATO (nomination of European generals in key functions, withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from continental Europe,…) whilst demanding the power to build operational bases for common defence (European HQ, own means,…). The United States will have neither a great wish nor a great capacity to oppose it because of the internal political trends which aim at reducing the size of their own army (3).

At the same time, and in the rationale of François Hollande’s statements on the usefulness of a European seat at the UN Security Council, one has to expect several French initiatives around the concept of Europe-power. They will involve the European presence in international organisations and the positioning of the French nuclear deterrent in the European defence system. These practical details will be the fruit of the discussions of these informal networks integrating the heads of the ministries and heads of government involved. Probably, the creation of a Euroland geopolitical network will result in the introduction of three major proposals in 2014: the holding of Euroland meetings before important votes of the Security Council to determine the position of Euroland countries sitting on the Security Council (including France), the support for a vast reform of the Security Council and major international institutions creating specific seats for Euroland (2 or 3 according to the institution) instead of national seats, and finally, the establishment of a Euroland “nuclear committee” (probably only Franco-German at the outset) intended to associate the other countries to the French nuclear deterrent (4).

As regards global partnerships, Germany having already shown itself as the example at the time of the attack on Libya, Euroland will quickly approach the network of BRICS countries since its economic, commercial, financial, monetary and geopolitical interests converge. We have already had the occasion to address the anticipation on Euro-BRICS relations in the GEAB N°56 in detail and the report of the Europe 2020 seminar on the subject which was held in Moscow in May 2011. We confirm two significant elements here: the holding, at the latest in 2015, of a Euro-BRICS summit which will illustrate the independence of Euroland international activity (5); and importance of the relationship with Europe for the BRICS. We underline this last point because it can appear paradoxical.

In fact, the BRICS network is still a very fragile project, bringing together countries often with very divergent, even conflicting interests (which is particularly China’s case with respect to Russia and India), and whose principal raison d'être at this stage is together being able to get their voice better heard at world level. The setting up of a Euro-BRICS partnership would further reinforce the nature of the “lever of influence” of the BRICS network, reinforcing its legitimacy and bringing in the European partner with which each BRICS is used to discussing and which can help to structure the multiple sub-networks (education, research, environment, social,…) that the BRICS start to set up. Finally, only the combined Euro + BRICS weight is able to change world governance, to rebalance towards the social dimension the current Anglo-Saxon financial chaos and to recast the international monetary system in particular by replacing the US Dollar by a global currency (a preliminary to any lasting exit from the crisis). In continental Europe, starting from 2012, public opinion will increasingly push so that these developments occur, bringing a strong drive to the closer cooperation between Euroland and the BRICS. This Euro-BRICS co-operation won’t avoid difficult questions like that of international trade and the inevitable reinforcement of Euroland customs protection. On the contrary, it will offer a general framework of negotiations making it possible to approach a whole series of convergence and divergence points between Euroland and the BRICS simultaneously.

The potential of this embryonic Euro-BRICS co-operation will be tested in 2013 in the framework of the first G20 summit to be held outside the West, namely in Moscow. Russia will be able to put “taboo” questions on the summit’s table such as the role and the future of the Dollar in the world monetary system. It will be the occasion for Euroland and the BRICS to discover in vivo if they are able to free themselves from the “world of before the crisis” and build the one “after the crisis”. If the test is positive and the G20 debates finally relate to the fundamental problems, then Euro-BRICS co-operation will be launched on a very promising road and it will be it and it alone which is able to give the G20 the legitimacy which it has never had: that of an association where the world of tomorrow really is being prepared. Let’s not forget that Euroland and the BRICS represent a big majority of the world’s wealth and population.


(1) The United States and the United Kingdom are insolvent and nothing but a shadow of their former selves in scientific and technological matters. The conquest of space provides a brilliant illustration: Europe is turning at great speed with a capital S to Russia, Japan, India and China for its future partnerships. Washington is no longer able to send men into space by itself (and contrary to US official announcements, this situation will continue for the whole decade at least). And this week once again, the United States had to cancel, for lack of funds, their involvement in the important Exomars mission jointly conceived with the ESA. Source: Cyberpresse, 11/02/2012

(2) And it’s not only a question of US military budget cuts. Thus the ongoing failure of the JSF put off Washington’s docile allies definitively which is in the process of losing billions for a plane which is never really likely to be operational. The Afghan failure and the Libyan adventure will weigh heavily in the refusal to continue to accept a US leadership which has mainly led NATO into dead ends these last ten years. An eventual attack on Iran would do nothing but reinforce this division between the two sides of the Atlantic and the English Channel.

(3) Keep in mind that according to LEAP/E2020, the complete withdrawal of the US troops of continental Europe will be effective in 2017. See GEAB N°59.

(4) At the same time, strategically, it is probable that London will be busy trying to find a solution to an independent Scotland’s refusal to keep the English nuclear submarine base there. Plymouth is already in the running. Source: Thisisplymouth, 27/01/2012

(5) In fact, this summit will be prepared by the Eurozone and not by the EU. The United Kingdom will probably not be involved, except in so far as radical changes become manifest in London by then.

Mardi 24 Juillet 2012
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GEAB N°90 - Contents

- Published on December 15, 2014 -

Global systemic crisis 2015 – Oil, currencies, finance, societies, the Middle East : Massive storm in the Western port!

. « Global systemic crisis: the end of the West we have known since 1945 »
. The oil crisis is systemic because it is linked to the end of the all-oil era
. The US in one hell of a state
. Europe post-Ukraine: lots of questions
. Three missions for the new Europe: resolve the Ukrainian crisis, put Euro-Russian relations back on the right path, avoid a European QE
. Middle East: traditional alliances’ big waltz
. Saudi Arabia, Iran: the allies change sides
. And Western « values » in all this
Read the public announcement

2015 – new phase of the crisis: the oil systemic crisis

. The impact of speculation
. Price War
. Systemic oil crisis and finance
. Systemic oil crisis and geopolitics

Investments, trends and recommendations

. Oil: beware!
. Energy intensive industries like airline companies
. Renewable energy: the good and the bad
. 2015: Euro & Yen rebound
. Gold: still safe

Evaluation of our anticipations for 2014
(from GEAB N° 81 in January 2014): a 69% success rate